Encouraging Compliance Without Real Power: Sport Associations Regulating Teams

in Journal of Sport Management
View More View Less
  • 1 University of Oregon
  • 2 University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Restricted access

Purchase article

USD  $24.95

Student 1 year online subscription

USD  $85.00

1 year online subscription

USD  $114.00

Student 2 year online subscription

USD  $162.00

2 year online subscription

USD  $216.00

Popular and academic discourse typically analyze the strategies used to induce compliance with sport association policies and rules within a framework that shoehorns a diverse array of strategies into two categories: sanctions or compensation, This article proposes a taxonomy that goes beyond the “logic of consequences” inherent in the behavioral models of sanctions and compensation. Sport managers and scholars can encourage compliance through six ideal-type strategies: punitive, remunerative, generative, preventive, cognitive, and normative. These six categories provide the foundation for systematically evaluating the relative effectiveness of different strategies at altering the behavior of league members. This article delineates the different paths by which these different policy strategies influence behavior. Five questions designed to guide managers in the selection of strategies are offered. Although the National Collegiate Athletic Association is used as a case example throughout, the framework has applicability to all sport associations.

Ronald B. Mitchell is with the Department of Political Science at the University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1284. Todd Crosset and Carol A. Barr are with the Sport Management Program at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003.

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 458 386 131
Full Text Views 13 13 12
PDF Downloads 1 1 0