David K. Stotlar
David K. Stotlar and David A. Johnson
This study investigated the effectiveness of stadium advertising on sports spectators in selected NCAA Division I football and basketball programs, utilizing intermediate measures and recognition testing techniques. Research questions included whether sport spectators would recognize the presence of stadium advertising and could identify all of it. The factors of age, income level, seat location, number of games attended, and location of stadium advertising were analyzed as to their effects on spectator recognition. Based on the findings of this research, sport facilities have been shown to be an ideal medium for products that appeal to sport spectators. A majority of spectators noticed advertising, and approximately 7 out of 10 correctly identified it. Advertising locations that were “part of the game” were shown to be more effective than those on the scoreboards. Results of this study demonstrated that stadium advertising effectiveness can be assessed and that it provides the sponsors with an effective means for reaching sport spectators.
Timothy D. DeSchriver and David K. Stotlar
The goal of this paper was to analyze the cartel behavior of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The NCAA, with over 1,000 members, has overseen intercollegiate athletic competition and established rules of play. In addition, the NCAA has maintained a cartel agreement to maximize profits for its members. However, to maintain a cartel, the expected costs of violating the agreement must be greater than the expected benefits of violation. Within this paper, an economic model using NCAA Division I men's basketball tournament revenue data was developed to determine when teams had an incentive to violate the cartel agreement—that is, commit a rules violation. Tournament revenue data from 1982 to 1990 was obtained for teams in six conferences (Big East, Big 10, Pacific 10, Southeastern; Atlantic Coast, and Big 8). The economic model revealed that teams in the Big East, Big 10, and Pacific 10 conferences had the greatest financial incentive to violate NCAA regulations. The information provided in this paper may be useful to intercollegiate athletic administrators who attempt to reduce the occurrence of rules violations and strengthen the cartel.