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Daniel S. Mason

Although initially developed as cartels of independently owned and operated clubs joining to produce a sports product for spectator consumption, professional sports leagues have emerged as monopolies wielding significant economic power. By increasing revenue-sharing practices, and thus attempting to align owner interests, leagues have become single-business entities that maximize wealth for the league as a whole. Over the past four decades, the National Football League has implemented such practices to become the most popular team sport in North America. Using agency theory, this paper examines how the NFL's former commissioner, Pete Rozelle, and the League Executive Committee used these practices in order to increase League revenues and decrease opportunistic behavior by team owners. However, certain owners continue to act entrepreneurially, to the detriment of the League as a whole. This behavior is congruent with the tenets of agency theory, which contend that interests will diverge within a principal-agent relationship (e.g., the NFL— NFL teams). Until such time that team owners realize that the welfare of the other League clubs, along with their competitive equality, is paramount in retaining interest in and producing the League product, professional sports leagues will continue to be plagued with problems such as unnecessary franchise relocations and other acts of maverick owners.

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Jeremy J. Foreman, Joshua S. Bendickson, and Birton J. Cowden

likelihood of getting another head coaching job, consistent with previous research that found leaders of more deviant NFL teams are more likely to face adverse employment outcomes (e.g.,  Foreman et al., 2019a ). First, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the agency problem with the rule changes

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Daniel S. Mason and Trevor Slack

Focusing on player agents in professional ice hockey, this paper utilizes the theoretical construct of agency theory as a means of evaluating attempts by several stakeholder groups to find solutions to opportunistic agent behavior. As proposed by agency theorists, this would include the creation and implementation of monitoring mechanisms by industry stakeholders in order to regulate agent activities. Stakeholder groups involved include state and federal governments, the agents themselves, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and Players' Associations, which, at various times, all have adopted forms of certification programs in attempts to monitor player agents. Documentation on these programs and interviews with industry stakeholders are employed to develop criteria by which such programs can be assessed in terms of their ability to reduce traditional agency problems. In doing so, it is argued that the agency model can be used to provide additional insight into problems associated with these programs and to improve program effectiveness in monitoring hockey agent behavior.

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Daniel S. Mason, Lucie Thibault, and Laura Misener

This article discusses agency problems in sport organizations in which the same individuals are involved in both the management and control of decision making. We focus our analysis on the case of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by reviewing the behavior of selected IOC members with regard to the bidding process for the Olympic Games and the resulting reform attempts made by the IOC in an effort to address issues of corruption. After a review of examples of corrupt behavior on the part of IOC members, agency theory is introduced to discuss IOC reforms and provide some suggestions for future reform. We propose incorporating other stakeholders (in addition to the IOC members), such as corporate partners, media conglomerates, and other members of the Olympic movement (e.g., athletes, coaches, officials), into management and control functions. More specifi cally, it is suggested that these stakeholders comprise a board that oversees the operations of the IOC (similar to the IOC’s current executive committee) and be given the ability to remove and/or sanction IOC members who act self-interestedly to the detriment of the Olympic movement. Thus, by delegating the control function of decision making to a board and the management function to internal agents, greater accountability for all organization members can be achieved.

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Anthony Krautmann, Peter von Allmen, and Stephen J.K. Walters

agency problems may be a contributing factor as to who does and does not mitigate their risk by signing multiyear extensions, and that some players might be prevented from enjoying the security of long-term contracts because their agents face less risk than their clients and bargain accordingly. Should

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Gidon Jakar and Stephanie Gerretsen

. ( 1988 ). Revenue sharing as an incentive in an agency problem: An example from the National Football League . The RAND Journal of Economics, 19 ( 1 ), 27 – 43 . doi:10.2307/2555395 10.2307/2555395 Brower , J.J. ( 1977 ). Professional sports club ownership: Fun, profit and ideology of the power

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Thilo Kunkel, Daniel C. Funk, and Daniel Lock

1441-3523(99)70089-6 Mason , D.S. ( 1997 ). Revenue sharing and agency problems in professional team sport: The case of the National Football League . Journal of Sport Management, 11 , 203 – 222 . doi: 10.1123/jsm.11.3.203 Mason , D.S. ( 1999 ). What is the sports product and who buys it? The

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Jonathan Robertson, Mathew Dowling, Marvin Washington, Becca Leopkey, Dana Lee Ellis, and Lee Smith

of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create institutions or transform existing ones” ( Maguire et al., 2004 , p. 657). This research domain emerged, in part, in response to the “paradox of embedded agencyproblem which questions how it

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Kathryn L. Heinze and Di Lu

school athletes in 20 sports . The American Journal of Sports Medicine, 40 ( 4 ), 747 – 755 . PubMed doi:10.1177/0363546511435626 10.1177/0363546511435626 Mason , D.S. ( 1997 ). Revenue sharing and agency problems in professional team sport: The case of the National Football League . Journal of