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Jeremy J. Foreman, Joshua S. Bendickson, and Birton J. Cowden

increased regulation affect on-field performance? and (b) Do coaching strategies based on penalties accrued affect subsequent head coaching opportunities? To examine these questions, we used agency theory. Because these rule changes are largely focused on the protection of the players, and because firms

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Daniel S. Mason, Lucie Thibault, and Laura Misener

This article discusses agency problems in sport organizations in which the same individuals are involved in both the management and control of decision making. We focus our analysis on the case of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) by reviewing the behavior of selected IOC members with regard to the bidding process for the Olympic Games and the resulting reform attempts made by the IOC in an effort to address issues of corruption. After a review of examples of corrupt behavior on the part of IOC members, agency theory is introduced to discuss IOC reforms and provide some suggestions for future reform. We propose incorporating other stakeholders (in addition to the IOC members), such as corporate partners, media conglomerates, and other members of the Olympic movement (e.g., athletes, coaches, officials), into management and control functions. More specifi cally, it is suggested that these stakeholders comprise a board that oversees the operations of the IOC (similar to the IOC’s current executive committee) and be given the ability to remove and/or sanction IOC members who act self-interestedly to the detriment of the Olympic movement. Thus, by delegating the control function of decision making to a board and the management function to internal agents, greater accountability for all organization members can be achieved.

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Millicent Kennelly and Kristine Toohey

This paper employs agency theory and resource dependence theory to explore relationships between Australian national sport governing bodies and commercial tour operators. These relationships produce domestic and international travel packages to major sport events and can provide commercial revenue to sport governing bodies. The research identifies agency challenges inherent in the relationships and how these are managed by sport governing bodies. Findings indicate that while sport governing bodies and tour operators interact to generate revenue, the two parties have divergent attitudes toward risk, particularly risks associated with pursuit of profit. The sport governing bodies manage interaction with tour operators through control of event tickets, a perishable and finite resource. The research contributes insights into the challenges confronting sport governing bodies attempting to diversify revenue into commercial sport tourism, as well as the underexplored role of sport bodies in facilitating major event tourism.

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Anthony Krautmann, Peter von Allmen, and Stephen J.K. Walters

and Slack ( 2001 , 2003 , 2005 ) are particularly important to our work as they shed considerable light on the applicability of agency theory to player–agent relationships. As such, they provide a platform for sharply focused research on specific aspects of agency theory, such as the ability of the

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Richard J. Paulsen

). Agency theory and principal-agent alignment masks: An examination of penalties in the National Football League . Journal of Sport Management, 35 ( 2 ), 105 – 116 . doi: 10.1123/jsm.2019-0352 Frick , B. ( 2011 ). Performance, salaries, and contract length: Empirical evidence from German soccer

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Richard J. Paulsen

This paper uses Major League Baseball data to examine the relationship between years remaining on player contracts and player performance. There is a potential for moral hazard to arise in this principal–agent relationship as the player may choose a less than optimal level of effort from the perspective of team management when the player has many guaranteed years remaining. A player fixed-effects estimation strategy, which finds a significant negative relationship between years remaining and performance, is employed. The primary contribution of this work is to show that this relationship is due to shirking. Alternative explanations for this relationship, such as teams signing improving players to multiyear contracts or players facing an adjustment process when joining a new team, are addressed. Additional evidence which is consistent with shirking behavior shows that shirking occurs on offense, not defense, and for position players, not pitchers.

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Daniel S. Mason

Although initially developed as cartels of independently owned and operated clubs joining to produce a sports product for spectator consumption, professional sports leagues have emerged as monopolies wielding significant economic power. By increasing revenue-sharing practices, and thus attempting to align owner interests, leagues have become single-business entities that maximize wealth for the league as a whole. Over the past four decades, the National Football League has implemented such practices to become the most popular team sport in North America. Using agency theory, this paper examines how the NFL's former commissioner, Pete Rozelle, and the League Executive Committee used these practices in order to increase League revenues and decrease opportunistic behavior by team owners. However, certain owners continue to act entrepreneurially, to the detriment of the League as a whole. This behavior is congruent with the tenets of agency theory, which contend that interests will diverge within a principal-agent relationship (e.g., the NFL— NFL teams). Until such time that team owners realize that the welfare of the other League clubs, along with their competitive equality, is paramount in retaining interest in and producing the League product, professional sports leagues will continue to be plagued with problems such as unnecessary franchise relocations and other acts of maverick owners.

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Daniel S. Mason and Trevor Slack

Focusing on player agents in professional ice hockey, this paper utilizes the theoretical construct of agency theory as a means of evaluating attempts by several stakeholder groups to find solutions to opportunistic agent behavior. As proposed by agency theorists, this would include the creation and implementation of monitoring mechanisms by industry stakeholders in order to regulate agent activities. Stakeholder groups involved include state and federal governments, the agents themselves, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and Players' Associations, which, at various times, all have adopted forms of certification programs in attempts to monitor player agents. Documentation on these programs and interviews with industry stakeholders are employed to develop criteria by which such programs can be assessed in terms of their ability to reduce traditional agency problems. In doing so, it is argued that the agency model can be used to provide additional insight into problems associated with these programs and to improve program effectiveness in monitoring hockey agent behavior.

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Daniel S. Mason and Trevor Slack

This paper examines the professional hockey industry to explore the principles of agency theory. Using basic tenets derived from the agency literature and conditions specific to the hockey industry, a series of propositions are developed. These are investigated using data from industry documents, popular articles on hockey, and interviews with players, agents, team managers and other relevant industry stakeholders. The results suggested that concerns for agent reputation, agent competition, agent certification and salary disclosure have cumulatively reduced information asymmetry favoring the agent and have decreased the likelihood of agent opportunism. This has resulted in a decrease in the use of commissions by agents, but this form of performance contingent compensation remains the most widely used form of remuneration.

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Gi-Yong Koo, Sara Shoffner, and Jeeheon Ryu

The purpose of this study was to investigate how an animated pedagogical agent (APA) affected an individual’s level of situational interest (SI) using a case study in online education. Although online learning has become popular, the lack of social cues for students in distance-learning contexts has been suggested as problematic. APA has been conceptualized to support social agency theory between students and learning contents. SI has been considered to activate student’s immediate affective response to engage in an authentic learning context. The study examined the effect of APA in a case study on triggered-SI and maintained-SI to determine the benefits of multimedia-based instruction in online learning. A three-factor model including triggered-SI, maintained-SI-feeling, and maintained-SI-value was tested. Results revealed that the use of APA in a case study more positively stimulated students’ SI specific to triggered-SI and maintained-SI-value. Therefore, the implementation of the APA in a distance education setting could benefit students’ learning and also help educators to more effectively deliver a variety of sport management content areas.